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Respondents
The respondents are part of the Sussex Energy Group and Science Policy Research Unit at the School 
of Business, Management and Economics at the University of Sussex.
Response
Note: We have provided answers to several, but not all questions in which the Committee has 
expressed an interest, with particular emphasis on the question of small modular reactors
Whether Wylfa Newydd will be built on schedule
In answering this, we examine issues related to both previous international experience of the ABWR 
reactor design, as well as matters related to the UK regulatory system, and current and recent new 
build experience. Horizon nuclear power, acquired by GE-Hitachi in 2012, has plans to construct a 
new Advanced Boiled Water Reactor (ABWR) at the Wylfa site on Anglesey, currently the location of 
a Magnox nuclear power station whose final reactor ceased operation in December 2015.  The 
ABWR is the only Generation III reactor to be operating anywhere in the world, with four reactors 
operating in Japan (Kashiwazaki-Kariwa units 6 & 7, Hamaoka 5, and Shika 2). 2 more ABWRs were 
under construction in Taiwan (Lungmen 1 and 2), but these construction projects have been 
suspended (1). In addition to Japan and Taiwan, the USA has also completed the licensing process for 
the ABWR design.   Experience with the four completed ABWRs is that they have had relatively short 
construction times when compared to the other relevant Gen III reactor design (the European 
Pressurized Reactor). All reactors in Japan have been completed in a 5-6 year period (3).
 
The only other ABWR reactors under construction in the world are at the now-suspended Lungmen 
plant in Taiwan where construction started in 1999. It was expected to be completed in 2004 
however construction was still occurring in 2015 when the plant was 90% complete when the 
construction process was suspended due to public protests. But before this, the construction of the 
two reactors at Lungmen had been repeatedly delayed, although the reasons for this are complex, 
entailing a range of regulatory, political and environmental factors. 
In terms of new build projects in the UK, the other Generation III reactor project at Hinkley Point (an 
EPR) is facing significant difficulties, where construction has not started and no final investment 
decision has been made by EDF. Where construction of EPRs has begun (in France and Finland), the 
projects are significantly behind schedule (9 years, in the case of Finland). The PWRs planned for 
Hinkley Point, and those in Finland and France, are of course a different type of reactor than the 
ABWR. The recent past experience that can be drawn on shows that it took 7 years to construct  
after a very lengthy pre-construction period (2) and Torness 1 and 2 took 8 and 9 years respectively 
(ibid). 
The proposed schedule for the ABWR at Wylfa outlined by Horizon is for construction to start in 
2019 and for completion in ‘the first half’ of the 2020s (3). This timetable seems optimistic given 
various stages that the Wylfa project will still need to go through. For one, there is the Generic 
Design Assessment (GDA) of the ABWR design as it is not yet licenced in the UK. Good progress has 
been made, with the timetable being adhered to, and ‘step 3’ of the GDA now being concluded. 
However, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) states that in terms of ‘step 4’, there is a “vast 
amount of work to be delivered through step 4”, that “first time quality will be critical” and that 
“Hitachi-GE will have to increase pace” in terms of the identification and resolution of issues (4 p.6). 
If the schedule of the GDA is kept to, then a 2019 construction start date is possible, but there still 
needs to be negotiation around the ‘strike price’ which took much longer than expected in the case 
of Hinkley C. Other potential issues are concerns over labour supply. If Hinkley C is being constructed 
at the same time as Wylfa, then there could be labour shortage issues. The Nuclear Skills Alliance 
identifies several ‘pinch points’ which suggest that by 2020 there could be significant labour 
shortages which could make simultaneous nuclear new build challenging in the UK (5).
What the cost of Wylfa Newydd will be and whether it represents value for money 
Very little information has been released about the anticipated costs of constructing Wylfa. More 
detailed costs will be provided by Horizon if or when the stage of making a Development Consent 
Order is reached. The independent consulting group Miller were commissioned by the Welsh 
Government to study nuclear industrial prospects for Wales over the coming decades. They 
calculated that the cost for planning and constructing Wylfa, for construction start in 2019 and 
completion in 2025, allowing for inflation, might be £14 billion (6). But as the authors point out, this 
uses the medium point estimates of the Parsons Brinckerhoff model which looks at generic costs of 
PWR reactors. These generic costs of reactor types do not take in ‘site specific’ factors, and thus as 
Parsons Brinckerhoff note, “it should be noted that nuclear costs are considered, as for other 
technologies, on a generic rather than a site-specific basis. They may therefore differ from the cost 
of particular planned projects in the UK” (7 p. 24).  The second issue is that the cost projections are 
for a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) rather than an ABWR, for which there is limited construction 
experience. 
In terms of the construction experience of ABWRs, the four reactors constructed in Japan were all 
constructed in a 5-6 year period which is a good track record in terms of timing. However As Thomas  
reports, total construction costs of the first two units were $3,236 per kilowatt for the first unit and 
$2,800 per kilowatt for the second, being well above the forecast range as originally reported (8 p.9) 
(9). The reactors in Taiwan, now mothballed, experienced continual cost escalations (10).  By 2008, 
Lungmen 1&2 were five years behind schedule and costs had risen from $3.7 billion to between $7-9 
billion. In the USA, where the ABWR was originally licenced in 1997, no reactor order has been 
placed.  In 2006 plans were announced by NRG Energy to build two ABWRs at the South Texas 
Nuclear Generating Station site.  However in 2011 NRG abandoned an agreement with Toshiba, the 
main contractor.  This was due to continual cost-escalations since 2006 exacerbated by the 
Fukushima disaster in 2011 (11,12).
Another problematic factor in assessing the costs of Wylfa given limited ABWR construction 
experience relates to the repeated historic trend of initial cost projections of new nuclear build 
underestimating final total costs - for a variety of reasons and often by very large margins (13–19).  
For example, Sovacool et al (20) in a recent international assessment of over 401 energy 
infrastructure projects found that nuclear power was most likely out of all energy technologies to 
experience a cost overrun, and such an overrun was most likely (on average) to double their cost. 
Another factor is that projections of future nuclear costs are not ‘site specific’ yet much of the total 
cost of constructing nuclear power depends on siting. On-site engineering may account for over 60% 
of the total construction cost, while other non-site-specific items such as the steam generators and 
the pressure vessel may account for a smaller proportion of total cost (21). Considering the absence 
of experience in building any kind of BWR in the UK, and potential labour and bottleneck issues that 
could be caused by simultaneous projects such as Hinkley C, ‘on site’ cost escalations are a 
significant possibility. 
The Nuclear Energy Agency (22) point out that an increase in the load factor (availability) of a 
nuclear reactor can lead to a substantial decrease in costs. Looking at the ABWR reactors in Japan 
and load factors, the reactors have had several unplanned outages, some years achieving less than a 
40% load factor (2). These ABWRs have been beset with various technical difficulties, leading to zero 
output in 2008. For a pre-Fukushima Japan with considerable nuclear capacity, this may not be such 
an issue, but in the context of the UK with associated energy security issues being a leading 
justification for the new nuclear development at Wylfa, these difficulties suggest that ABWRs may 
not yet be fully reliable.
This discussion can be simply summarised: no-one can yet have a clear idea of the construction cost 
of Wylfa Newydd, and this situation will not change for several years i.e. until we have UK 
construction experience.  Whether it will offer value for money as a whole is an even harder 
question and depends on ‘internal’ factors such as its operational reliability and ‘external’ factors, 
especially the cost of alternative sources of generation.
What the strike price (the guaranteed price per kilowatt hour for electricity for the owners of 
Wylfa Newydd) from Wylfa Newydd is likely to be and what impact it will have on energy prices in 
Wales 
It is impossible to know what the strike price for Wylfa Newydd will be.  Although the UK 
Government favours the idea of using auctions to determine strike prices, and has successfully done 
so for some renewables, this is impossible where there are no competitive pressures and instead a 
sequence of large one-off projects.  The strike price for Wylfa Newydd will therefore almost certainly 
be the result of a non-transparent bargaining process between Government and Horizon, much as 
the strike price for Hinkley Point was determined.  Given Horizon’s confidence in the economics of 
ABWRs, and the political difficulties in announcing a higher strike price than for Hinkley Point, the 
signs are that a strike price at Wylfa will be somewhere below the £92.5/MWh agreed for Hinkley 
Point, but beyond that, very little can be said.  
The impact of the strike price on Welsh electricity prices will be negligible.  Even if the strike price 
were to be high, this would make a very limited difference to electricity prices in Wales, because the 
market from which prices emerge is for GB as a whole, not Wales.   
How the decommissioning of Wylfa and Trawsfynydd is being carried out 
Decommissioning at all Magnox sites comes under the responsibility of the Nuclear 
Decommissioning Authority and is implemented by Magnox Limited, the Site Licence Company 
responsible for all GB Magnox sites.   Decommissioning at Trawsfynydd is further advanced than at 
Wylfa because it ceased generation well before Wylfa.  Trawsfynydd is one of two sites, along with 
Bradwell, that has been marked out for learning from early experience in preparing the site for entry 
to ‘Care and Maintenance’.  This state of ‘Care and Maintenance’ involves what the NDA describes as 
‘quiescence’, (23 p. 26) meaning that the site can be rendered safe, and can be effectively 
abandoned for several decades prior to final site clearance.  At present the expectation is that 
Trawsfynydd will enter Care and Maintenance in 2027-28, with final clearance between 2074 and 
2083, while the equivalent dates for Wylfa are 2025-2026 and 2096-2015. (23) While preparations 
for quiescence are ongoing, both sites will continue to generate employment, but after this state has 
been achieved there would be – all else equal – virtually no activity at either site for many decades.  
However, the NDA’s draft Strategy (23) argues strongly for a fundamental review of Magnox 
decommissioning strategy, involving examination of the case for a continuous process of 
decommissioning at some sites, rather than the current idea of long periods of inactivity across all 
sites (ibid, pp. 26-27.)  This could in principle impact on medium term employment opportunities at 
Trawsfynydd and the Committee might wish to pursue this further with the NDA.
What potential there is for small modular reactors to be built at Trawsfynydd and how that will 
impact decommissioning and future planning 
Increasingly  the UK government has been looking favourably towards Small Modular Reactors 
(SMRs), defined as having a capacity of 300MW or less, to be deployed in the UK in the relatively 
near future. Trawsfynydd has specifically been identified as a potentially favourable site where SMRs 
could be deployed (24).  £250 million worth of funds for R&D into nuclear for the next five years was 
announced by the Chancellor in the November 2015 spending review with SMRs identified as a 
priority, and a recent ‘enabler project’ into SMRs was announced in February 2016. The National 
Nuclear Laboratory (25) in a review of SMRs  – termed, not entirely convincingly,  a ‘feasibility study’ 
-  argued that SMRs could be deployed “within a ten year timeframe” and that there could be 
between 7GW and 21GW of SMRs in operation in the UK by 2035. Even the lower end of this range is 
ambitious, and the upper end, for reasons argued below, seems well out of reach.  This is partly due 
to the international context of SMRs, as well as UK-specific barriers to deployment.  The issue of 
deployment at Trawsfynydd is also discussed below.
A major difficulty in assessing the viability of developing SMRs in the UK is that there are no 
commercially operable SMRs anywhere in the world (26).  And despite the USA being the most 
credible place from which the UK would acquire SMRs (because significant public and private R&D 
resources have already led to a wide range of design ideas), no SMR has even begun the US safety 
licensing process (27). The licensing procedure in the USA, as well as in the UK, will not necessarily 
be straightforward given the ‘first of a kind’ features that SMRs may possess (28). Certainly the idea 
that SMR licensing might be ‘fast tracked’ relative to the process for larger reactors lacks credibility: 
Dr Hall of the ONR explained to the Energy and Climate Change Select Committee  (29 p. 15) that 
SMR safety licensing, including site-specific issues, would take around six years, the same time as for 
large reactors.  There are also potential regulatory capacity issues in the UK: the ONR is currently 
licensing the ABWR, the AP100 and could potentially be also licensing the Chinese Hualong design 
given the UK/France/China deal on the finance of the Hinkley project.  Additional licensing of novel 
SMRs could place extra strain on the resources of the ONR and could contribute to delay.   
Given the absence of commercial experience with SMRs anywhere, their economic status is even 
more uncertain than for larger reactors – where, as outlined elsewhere in this evidence, there is 
always substantial uncertainty (generally optimism) even for well-established designs.  SMR 
economic viability depends on reversing the traditional, persistent and largely credible argument of 
the nuclear industry that there are economies of scale in making reactors bigger.  SMRs could only 
overturn this argument if two conditions are powerfully present.  The first is that factory production 
would minimise the kinds of ‘on site’ cost escalations that have been problematic for conventional 
nuclear reactors.   The second is that if there are orders for a large number of SMR units, then 
economies of scale in manufacturing multiple units would kick in.  Lack of any real-world experience 
makes these arguments hard to test.  The need for such a factory in advance of construction is 
another factor that puts the NNL timescale of ‘within ten years’, and at scale by 2035, in serious 
doubt. 
A more recent study by Mott MacDonald for the Energy Technologies Institute (30) is more plausible 
and rigorous.  It argues that for relatively ‘conventional’ SMRs – essentially cut-down and 
modernised versions of the PWR technology widely used for larger reactors – the timescale to first 
deployment would be of the order of 17 years, assuming no full-scale demonstrator plant would be 
needed, and for more radical designs, this would stretch to 26 years (ibid. p.6).  While the report 
argues that some SMRs may already be ‘some way along this timeline’ of 17 years, it seems unlikely, 
given the absence of any UK history in these small reactors that any deployment could occur before 
the early 2030s at best.  Scepticism about deployment any sooner than the early 2030s is reinforced 
by DECC’s espousal of the idea that there should first be a competition to determine the best SMR 
design for the UK (31). If experience with competitions for Carbon Capture and Storage projects is 
any kind of guide, this suggests that additional years might be added to the pre-deployment 
timescale.  It is also probable that such ‘conventional’ SMR designs, while possessing advantages in 
terms of regulatory processes and potential performance, are precisely those where the 
diseconomies of small scale are difficult to avoid - given their generic similarities to larger PWRs that 
have been expected by the industry over several decades to achieve substantial scale economies.  
The Mott MacDonald report also argues convincingly that the lowest costs likely for SMRs depend on 
the commercial use of the (otherwise wasted) heat produced by the nuclear reaction in addition to 
electricity (30 p 25-6). This would involve connecting SMRs to district heating schemes.  This in turn 
means that the location of SMRs would need to be close to substantial heat loads, either industrial 
or domestic. This is a serious handicap to the idea that Trawsfynydd would be a good SMR site as it is 
in a relatively isolated location, some distance from large heat loads. If Trawsfynydd were therefore 
a location for SMRs, there would be a significant financial penalty compared to other potential sites 
(including several current nuclear reactor sites) that are much closer to heat loads.  Potential 
developers of SMRs at Trawsfynydd would be unlikely to get any significant financial benefit from 
selling heat and would therefore need specific financial inducements to locate in Snowdonia rather 
than an economically more favourable site.  
Whether the Welsh Government and UK Government are co-ordinating their policy in this area
In relation to decommissioning, NDA manages public sector sites across all three GB countries, and 
there is no public indication that either NDA or the UK Government are doing anything, in relation to 
England and Wales, that is other than co-ordinated.  In relation to new build, both the Welsh and UK 
Governments have made strong positive statements about the need for nuclear new-build, including 
at all potentially active sites.  The two governments clearly have a common purpose in this area, 
whether or not they actively ‘co-ordinate policy’ - about which there is little public evidence.  
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